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At the start of the twentieth century, Halford Mackinder’s geopolit-
ical writings provided a powerful justification for British imperial-
ism. He presented imperialism as a force of nature by emphasising
historical rupture, essential conflict and geopolitical strategy. A
century later, these same themes re-appear in contemporary
accounts of our new world order and serve now to naturalise the
imperial mission of the United States. A critical examination of the
theses of Mackinder can aid in challenging the presumptions of
the new imperialists.
The centenary of Halford Mackinder’s (1861–1947) ‘Geographical pivot’
paper has been celebrated with historical and modern evaluations.1 The
article itself has been republished, together with the discussion that fol-
lowed its delivery and some modern alternatives.2 There is a new collec-
tion of essays on the legacy of Mackinder.3 In December 2004 Nick
Megoran organised a meeting in Tashkent to discuss the relevance of the
heartland concept for understanding the dilemmas of the countries of the
former Soviet Union.4 Paul Kennedy has praised Mackinder’s prescience
(as also that of Leo Amery in the contemporary discussion).5 Mackinder’s
writings have been invoked with regularity by those who believe that con-
temporary strategists are too idealistic in ever projecting a world at peace
with itself. Writing to tell Mackinder that the American Geographical Soci-
ety was to award Mackinder its Charles P. Daly medal, Isaiah Bowman
praised the British geographer’s ‘courage and foresight in publishing
“Democratic Ideals and Reality” at a time when the world in general was
beguiling itself with the thought that we had concluded a war to end
war.’6 Further, Bowman drew from Mackinder the lesson that the safety of
Europe required that Germany and Russia be endlessly pitted one against
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the other.7 Mackinder’s injunction to contain Russia has marched through
geostrategic writings ever since.8Democratic Ideals and Reality: a Study in
the Politics of Reconstruction, first published in London and New York in
1919, has seen further US editions in 1942, 1962, 1981 and 1996.9 With
each new edition comes an introduction insisting upon Mackinder’s con-
tinued relevance. Mackinder was flattered by the attention given his work
during the Second World War, referring with ironic self-deprecation to the
book ‘which I wrote in the six weeks following the Armistice of 1918.’10 It
was to his 1904 paper, that he wished to refer his admirer Hans Weigert
for ‘my views were already taking shape away back in 1904, and have not
been formed in a hurry.’11 As Mackinder was all too painfully aware, it
was this early paper on which ‘Haushofer based himself originally.’12
There are differences of strategic emphasis across Mackinder’s various ver-
sions of his geopolitical vision but there is, I believe, a consistent structure
of argument.
In this paper, I want to focus on three discursive strategies that allow
Mackinder’s work to carry political significance.13 They are, first, the identifi-
cation of a recent historical rupture underlining the urgency of a contempo-
rary crisis. For Mackinder, this historical break announced a new closed-space
world. Henceforth, no part of the world could be ignored by British strate-
gists. In a closed-space world, the British had a legitimate interest in the
affairs of every single part of the globe. Secondly, there is the characterisa-
tion of global politics as essentially a zero-sum game in which fundamen-
tally incompatible human aggregates confront each other. Finally, the global
conflict is understood as played out through territorial strategies that priori-
tise control over natural resources. I want to suggest that in some ways we
can see these intellectual tactics as allowing Mackinder to present the British
Empire as organic entity facing an immediate geostrategic crisis. In a blend
of free-will and determinism, characteristic of much environmentalist think-
ing,14 Mackinder presented British imperialism as a rationally directed force
of nature. The emphasis on free will was necessary to alert the British, or
at least the Anglo-Saxon, people to their momentous obligations. For Mac-
kinder, the British Empire had to ‘hold its place according to the universal
law of survival through efficiency and effort.’15 The British had to rise
about the ‘mere fatalism’ of the seemingly inevitable cycle of the rise and
decline of empires.16 The references to nature made this a question of
national, or racial, survival, rendering moot questions about the morality
of Empire. Nature, and the realpolitik to which it gave rise, was the reality
challenging purely idealistic notions of global fairness. The piety of paper
constitutions had to yield before the power-play of material forces. Much
current debate about the post-Cold-War New World Order seems to offer
similar prescriptions and does so by adopting, although rarely explicitly,
three discursive strategies evident in Mackinder’s work. It is because these
arguments lend support to imperialist activity that they prove so attractive
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76 Gerry Kearns
to imperialists, past and present. Beyond the direct influence of Mack-
inder on some strategists, there is a broader penumbra or thinkers who
naturalise empire in broadly similar ways to Mackinder without, perhaps,
having been directly influenced by his writings. In their treatment of his-
torical caesura, global conflict and global strategy, there are a number of
modern theorists who naturalise an American Empire and a supporting
role for the United Kingdom alongside the United States. With hindsight,
it is clear, at least to me, that there were serious difficulties with Mack-
inder’s attempt to urge Anglo-Saxon hegemony as the natural path for
Britain and its allies. I think that similar issues are raised by current advo-
cacy of a second American century.
A BREAK IN HISTORY
For Mackinder, the world of the early twentieth-century was entering a new
phase, a new closed-space existence in which events in any one part of the
world reverberated everywhere else, ‘we have now a closed circuit – a
machine complete and balanced in all its parts. Touch one and you influ-
ence all.’17 There were no more empty lands, ‘a surrounding circuit of
unknown space and barbaric chaos,’ to act as a safety valve for European
rivalries.18 Now, all across the world, the Great Powers faced up to each
other in competition for trade, markets, resources and military allies. The
survival of British power required that it exert its influence over all parts of
the globe. Events in each part of the world were the legitimate concern of
the British because those events would have consequences elsewhere,
including upon the British. The ‘post-Columbian age’19 presented new prob-
lems and the laissez-faire attitudes of the Victorian era would no longer do.
The old liberal policies of non-interference in the affairs of foreign coun-
tries, often honoured more in word than deed, were no longer adequate.
Likewise, free markets, either globally or domestically, were simply too
likely to be abused by other, less-liberal national economies. The British
people required social reform and racial purity at home, protection of
domestic markets and industries, unity among all the far-flung British peo-
ples be they in England, Canada, Australia or the United States, and, finally,
so friendly an administration of the colonies that the British could count
upon their ‘dark man-power’20 in the struggle to come. This bundle of poli-
cies promised a ‘reconciliation of Colonial Liberalism with protection, the
exclusion of coloured races and imperialism.’21 At the time, there were
many who could see very little that was liberal in any of this. For example,
John Hobson saw the very pursuit of empire as a rejection of the Noncon-
formist Liberal tradition that had opposed slavery and promoted trade as an
antidote to war.22 The transition from the Columbian to the post-Columbian
periods marks, for Mackinder, a shift from an era in which European powers
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Naturalising Empire: Echoes of Mackinder 77
could more or less ignore each other as they grew naturally into new spaces
consonant with their developing technological and demographic might, to a
new era where statecraft was suddenly vital. The new world order would
have to be fought over and would not spontaneously develop as the result
of European growth overseas.
There are three difficulties with this account of world history and its
new departure. In the first place, it ignores the agency involved in the cre-
ation of European empires in the so-called Columbian era. The Europeans
did not simply spread into empty space overseas. They took these spaces;
in some cases driving away or killing the aboriginal peoples and in all cases
reshaping local ecologies and economies to their own ends. In almost every
case, trade and flag went together, that is traders and soldiers, settlers and
armies went together into new lands, creating chaos of their own before
imposing order of their own. In the second place, this gives rise to a very a-
historical account of global inequality. In place of European agency in
coercing peoples into new arrangements, we are presented with global ine-
quality as a natural set of initial conditions, environmentally determined. Yet
slavery in some places, imperial taxes and new property relations in others
produced poverty for some as it garnered wealth for others. The circum-
stances facing Europeans abroad by 1900 can only be understood in the
light of this much longer history. The development question of the twenti-
eth century was a legacy of earlier colonialism.23 Finally, this view of history
overstated the extent and abruptness of recent changes. The relations
between Europe and the rest of the world were no zero-sum game after
1904. Colonialism, or the process that Harvey has called ‘accumulation by
dispossession,’24 continued after 1904. Europeans could still extract new
resources from new spaces without having to enter into wars with each
other to secure them.
Something very similar to this closed-space thinking is found in much
current geostrategic thinking. Robert Cooper has been a foreign policy advi-
sor to Tony Blair and also Britain’s ambassador to West Germany. He calls
for ‘a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights
and cosmopolitan values.’25 In an odd echo of Mackinder’s Colonial Liberal-
ism, this new Euro-American benign global rule is to be a Liberal Imperial-
ism. Cooper speaks of the ancient world in much the same way that
Mackinder spoke of the Columbian one: ‘in the ancient world, order meant
empire. Those within the empire had order, culture and civilisation. Outside
it lay barbarians, chaos and disorder.’26 His closed-space thinking is explicit:
‘in an age of globalisation no country is an island. Crises in Kashmir, the
Middle East or the Korean Peninsula affect security in every continent and
are the concern of everybody.’27 In 2002 as in 1904, we have a geostrategi-
cal vision that invokes a recent change to a closed-space world to urge that
laissez-faire geopolitics be set aside for a more assertive stance. For Cooper,
as for Blair, the twin threats are weapons of mass destruction in the hands
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78 Gerry Kearns
of unfriendly powers, and fanatical terrorists issuing forth from the ‘chaotic’
spaces that result when states ‘collapse.’28
For Cooper the new crisis arises from the end of the Westphalian age
(1648–1989).29 In the Westphalian age, Europe was organised as a series of
nation states. In turn, these nation states had organised much of the rest of
the world as a series of colonies. Now, Western Europe is moving towards a
post-modern state where sovereignty is shared between a number of states.
At the other extreme, in Africa people struggle to create something resem-
bling strong nation states out of the chaotic soup of post-colonialism. Figure 1
FIGURE 1 A schematic representation of Cooper’s account of the evolution of the world
order of pre-modern, modern and post-modern state forms.
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Naturalising Empire: Echoes of Mackinder 79
is a schematic representation of the historical geography implicit in Coo-
per’s work. In Antiquity, there were a number of empires (shown as ovals
with expansionary arrows) and within them there was order and regularity,
outside there was barbaric chaos. The empires tried to extend their order to
newer places. At some point, a modern nation-states system (shown as
squares in Figure 1b) developed in Europe and on this basis, the Europeans
gradually colonised most of the rest of the world (Figure 1c) bringing order
where previously there had only been pre-modern anarchy. After the Sec-
ond World War, the Europeans gradually withdrew from their colonies,
which were then incorporated into the bipolar world of the Cold War
(Figure 1d) where one set of capitalist states faced other socialist states. The
Cold War ‘froze Europe for forty years.’30 In Europe, there is a new experi-
ment in pooling sovereignty and Cooper suggests that this sees the
emergence of a postmodern system of states (represented as diamonds in
Figure 1e). Outside Europe, modern states exist amidst a chaos of pre-mod-
ern (failed), post-colonial and post-socialist states. Cooper would like the
modern and post-modern states to adopt sections of this chaos and offer
them the protection of either a Liberal Imperialism, or the extension of a
pooled sovereignty. In this spirit, Figure 1f shows an expanded area of
pooled-sovereignty post-modern states and then a series of empires in the
rest of the world.
The collapse of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe is understood by
many as a break in history. For many, it is as if a real historical process
could begin again after its socialist interregnum. Robert Kaplan, at one time
Bill Clinton’s favoured geostrategic thinker, suggests that Eastern Europe re-
entered history in 1989.31 Misha Glenny, from a very different perspective,
also speaks of the rebirth of history in the region.32 With the loosening of
the ice grip of the Soviet Empire, they suggest, East European ethnicities
could once again assert their primordial identities in bloody civil war. Simi-
lar arguments are made about post-colonial Africa where tribalism, not eth-
nicity, is highlighted. Again, this is very like Mackinder, identities are
naturalised and are naturally in conflict. The problems are likewise similar.
The active agency of many parties in creating and re-creating ethnicity is
elided. For Yugoslavia this means ignoring Tito’s policy of fostering regional
identities as a divide-and-rule strategy.33 Much the same happened in the
Soviet Union.34 Serbian nationalism was not primordial, it was cultivated by
Milosevic and his clique.35 Gaining power in the name of ethnic Serbs these
people could line their pockets during the unsteady creation of private
property and associated laws out of state socialism and political policing.
Djilas had anticipated this insisting that ‘this is not classical nationalism but a
more dangerous, bureaucratic nationalism built on economic self-interest.’36
Evoking a historical break to naturalise hegemony is nowhere clearer than
in the work of Francis Fukuyama. In 1989 he was a member of the Policy Plan-
ning Staff of the US Department of State and his essay on the significance of
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80 Gerry Kearns
the momentous changes of that year was entitled ‘The End of History?’37
The essay reflected the triumphalism of Reaganite foreign policy after the
fall of the Berlin Wall. Fukuyama’s argument was that the fall of commu-
nism meant that all alternatives to democratic capitalism had now been
rejected. ‘Today,’ he wrote, ‘we who live in stable, long-standing liberal
democracies … have trouble imagining a world that is radically better than
our own, or a future that is not essentially democratic and capitalist.’38 His-
tory, as progressive change, could continue, but history as the evolution of
ideal political and economic forms was over. All over the world, people
want, and largely have got, liberal democracies. Fukuyama adds that along-
side democracy, ‘liberal principles in economics’ have also spread ‘and have
succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of material prosperity, both
in industrially developed countries and in countries that had been, at the close
of World War II, part of the impoverished Third World.’39 Figure 2 shows the
way the End of History has come about. On one side there is a uniformity
FIGURE 2 Fukuyama’s account of the evolution of the hegemonic liberal society.
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Naturalising Empire: Echoes of Mackinder 81
of material life that comes from the use of a common science and common
technology across all economies. On the other, the pursuit of the innate
human desire for mutual recognition produces a general desire for rights as
the form in which this mutual respect could be secured. In economic terms,
a liberal economy allows people to find mutual recognition through valuing
the work that they each do. Democracy also reinforces capitalism by pro-
viding a further justification for the freedom of the market.
Note, here, that liberalisation is an automatic, autonomous process that
unfolds within states and spreads merely by force of example. Note also,
that economic and political equality are elided. In the face of the racial ine-
qualities in the United States, Fukuyama is content to that argue that, in the
United States, addressing injustices based on sexuality or unequal capacity
is due to ‘the smallness of its actual remaining inequalities.’40 Identity, then,
is the form that recognition-seeking takes when economic equality has been
substantially achieved. Fukuyama recognises that there are substantive ine-
qualities relating to housing but he does not mention poverty and, because
he cannot imagine an alternative to free markets, he will not accept that for-
mal rights are seriously compromised by substantive inequalities. In global
terms, treating states in isolation and presenting the Cold War as about ideas
and not about resources means he has far too benign a view of global capi-
talism. In post-colonial societies, free markets and liberal economics meant
preserving the property relations established through colonial theft. In place
after place, decolonisation was shaped by anxieties about nationalisation or
indigenisation of land and raw materials.41 Capitalism in the ex-colonies
rested upon a particular allocation of property rights, ensuring access to mar-
kets and resources for American and British business. Anglo-Saxon hegemony
today takes the form of UK/US plc., at least in the global extractive industries.
Asymmetries are maintained through coercion. Fighting totalitarianism meant
sustaining military juntas who were friendly to UK/US plc. even where popu-
list alternatives, abused as communist, were merely nationalist and had been
democratically elected. Despite Fukuyama’s arguments about convergence, in
fact liberal democracy and liberal economy have as often been in conflict as
in harmony throughout the post-colonial Third World.42
GLOBAL CONFLICT
The creation and maintenance of free markets and the hegemonic property
relations sustaining UK/US plc. requires active intervention through the IMF,
the World Bank, the WTO, Structural Adjustment Policies, and colonialist
wars to displace regimes that defy US hegemony.43 In Kosovo, for example,
a humanitarian crisis was invoked by Blair as justification for bombing, yet
while Germany received 20,000 refugees from the region, Britain accepted
but 300.44 The majority of human rights abuses in Kosovo date from the
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period after NATO bombing began and continued into the period of NATO
occupation.45 Pilger notes that in 1999, at the Davos summit, Blair’s main
complaint about Milosevic was that he was dragging heels over the liberali-
sation of the Serbian economy. He goes on to point out that at the Ram-
bouillet peace conference the NATO conditions for not bombing included
the requirement that all Serbian government assets be privatised.46 During
the NATO occupation the most precious of these were seized:
‘The jewel is the enormous Trepca [lead] mine complex, whose 1997 value
was estimated at $5bn. In an extraordinary smash and grab raid soon after
the war, the complex was seized from its workers and managers by more
than 2,900 Nato troops, who used teargas and rubber bullets.’47
With the removal of Milosevic a new privatisation law was passed that
replaced an earlier stipulation that 70% of state assets should be sold to
workers with a new arrangement under which only 15% is reserved for
workers and up to 70% can go to foreign investors. The new government
has also signed up to all the financial disciplines demanded by the World
Bank. Fukuyama’s account of the end of history hides this within a progres-
sive vision of the unfolding of Liberalism. Yet, it does so almost too com-
pletely because it legitimates few of these interventions. In one sense, this is
what worried Samuel Huntington and prompted him to write ‘The Clash of
Civilizations?’48 Huntington had been director of security planning for the
National Security Council in the Carter administration, was a founding editor
of Foreign Affairs and is currently chair of the Harvard Academy for Interna-
tional and Area Studies. For Huntington, there is not enough urgency in
Fukuyama. Huntington returns to a geopolitical vision much closer to Mack-
inder’s vision of recently intensified global conflict. For Mackinder, the fun-
damental units of the world order were not nations. Behind nations there
were races. These races had different proclivities with regards to political
values, indeed varying capacities for self-government. He insisted that ‘the
English race, the English blood, is valuable as carrying a certain character.’49
Only a world order under the tutelage of the diasporic British could safely
oversee the introduction of democracy among the lesser races. To preserve
this God-given hegemony, the United Kingdom needed a military alliance
with the United States and a protectionist ring around its Empire. The
resources beneath the feet of lesser races could not be left for them to
squander but should instead be exchanged for the products of British facto-
ries. The strength of the Anglo-Saxon race depended upon its purity and
there should thus be immigration- and, indeed, eugenic-controls in Britain.50
It is easy, and necessary, to characterise this as racist, but we need to
identify the components of that racism if we are to attend to the echoes of
Mackinder today. In the first place, it treats race as immutable and as deter-
mining of culture. Secondly, it assumes there is a stable hierarchy of races.
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Naturalising Empire: Echoes of Mackinder 83
Thirdly, racial contact is taken to be weakening of the superior race. Finally,
the races are thought to be naturally and continually in conflict. The superi-
ority of the European races was self-evident to Mackinder and the ‘external
barbarism’ of such as the Slavs acted in the manner of a ‘repellent personal-
ity’ that ‘performs a valuable social function in uniting his enemies.’51
A very similar, and equally paranoid, vision is at the heart of Hunting-
ton’s work. Like Fukuyama, he converted his original article into a book,
likewise dropping the question mark from the title in the process. He begins
with a closed-space premise. ‘The world,’ he says, ‘is becoming a smaller
place.’52 With greater contact, comes, he believes, a heightened awareness
of cultural difference and an increased anxiety about those differences.
These differences, then, have only become apparent since the globalisation
of contacts after 1500. Geopolitics, he believes, has moved progressively
from involving clashes between princes, through clashes between nation
states, through the clash of ideologies during the Cold War to the new cur-
rent phase. Much of this echoes Fukuyama but for Huntington the end of
the ideological war heralds not a liberal world order of capitalism and
democracy but another round of (differently constituted) global conflict.
With ideological differences buried, he argues that the pertinent global dif-
ferences will be cultural. Indeed, ‘The fault lines between civilizations will
be the battle lines of the future.’53 Civilisations, for Huntington, are the fun-
damental divisions of the human race. They are primarily cultural and have
been shaped by history. Religion is generally at their core and they have
markedly different preferences when it comes to political institutions and
systems. As the geographical context of people’s lives broadens they lose
localist attachments and re-invigorate fundamentalist religions. Furthermore,
global contact between elites makes them more aware of these religious
divisions leading them to cleave ever more strongly to indigenous belief
systems. Huntington divides the world into nine religiously based civilisa-
tions (he is not really sure if Africa has any distinct civilisation) and he offers
a map of these divisions based on groups of countries.54 Trade is becoming
increasingly confined to regional blocs focused on civilisations. Huntington
believes that you can neither choose nor change your civilisation and that
it’s your fate to have a certain identity together with the values that flow
from that.
Only Western, Christian civilisation is engaging with arms reduction. All
other peoples believe in expansionism if they can get away with it. In par-
ticular, claimed Huntington, ‘Islam has bloody borders.’55 In its commitment
to peace, then, Western civilisation is superior but dangerously naïve. Hun-
tington does not see civilisational spaces as homogeneous, or at least not
the Western space, for he worries that when Asian Americans, Spanish
Americans and African Americans become numerically dominant within the
United States, then its fundamental WASP values will be compromised. In
much the same fashion as the British demographer, David Coleman, he
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believes diversity is dilution.56 In his most recent book, Who are We?, he
worries about the Catholicisation of American culture by Latinos, a group,
he insists, who simply lack the work ethic of the WASPs.57 It is clear then,
that Huntington’s Western civilisation is not only Christian but Protestant,
and not only Protestant but White, and not only White but Anglo-Saxon.
There is something distinctly racist about this notion of civilisation.58 Yet
contrary to Huntington’s assumption, civilisations have been as likely to
learn from as to undermine each other. Religious regions are subject to
intense internal conflicts based on ethnicity and diverse Islamic theologies,
among other forms of difference, and do not form homogeneous blocs. The
major sources of conflict in the world today are more likely to be modern
than historical and ‘the biggest obstacle to peace or source of conflict is not
the cultural heritage but the hegemonic aspirations of countries and rulers
and their apologists.’59 It is also important to remember, as Ali argues, that
at least some of the conflicts within the Muslim world are actually fought by
US proxies, that is by groups funded by the United States.60 These struggles
are not self-evidently Islamic and the peaceable reputation of the world’s
hegemon is called into question.
Apologists for hegemony present asymmetrical violence as natural, as
inevitable. Robert Kaplan’s Warrior Politics tells Americans that rights are
fundamentally about power and as the country with the most global power,
the United States has to accept that it can never apply outside its borders
the justice and fairness it has the luxury of practising within its borders.
Overseas, the US must often do evil to do good.61 Robert Kagan is yet more
direct. Kagan was associated with the covert US campaign in support of the
Nicaraguan Contras in the mid-1980s and indeed pleaded guilty to two charges
of withholding information from Congress in the subsequent Iran-Contra trials.
Now one of the Pentagon’s favourite pundits, he was, with William Kristol, a
co-founder of the very influential Project for a New American Century. He
pushes even further than Kaplan the weakening of the legal constraints on
power. For Kagan, Europe remains within a ‘self-contained world of laws
and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation,’ a ‘post-historical
paradise of peace and relative prosperity.’62 Kagan is contemptuous of this
idealism, proffering, instead, the realism of remaining ‘mired in history …
where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still
depend on the possession and use of military might.’63 This is the American
view and, when the Europeans were powerful in the period before the First
World War, it was the European strategic vision too, for then, Europeans too
‘believed in Machtpolitik.’64 The US National Security Strategy of September
2002 was informed by such thinking and promised that the United States
would seek to have the military capacity to prevail against the combined
armed forces of the rest of the world put together.65 The US currently
accounts for about half the global military expenditure and is really now the
only truly global armed force on the planet; all other nations have little more
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than regional capacity. This recalls the policy of the United Kingdom in the
first decade of the last century. Then, the British wished to have a navy suffi-
cient to prevail against any possible coalition of enemies.66
The idea that it is might that makes rights is explicit in Philip Bobbitt’s
Shield of Achilles. Bobbitt is a nephew of Lyndon Johnson, a Law professor
at the University of Texas and has ‘served successively as Associate Counsel
to the President under Carter, Counsel to the Senate Iran-Contra Committee
under Reagan, Counsellor on International Law at the State Department
under Bush senior, and Director of Intelligence on the National Security
Council under Clinton.’67 Bobbitt is a constitutional lawyer with an interest
in the relations between military strategy and international law. He sees his-
tory as a discourse legitimating the appropriate legal order for the current
strategic circumstances. Figure 3 is a representation of his argument about
the relations between military strategy, international law and historic vision.
The column on the left shows the successive military revolutions that
appear to drive at least the earlier revolutions in government that produce
the series of state-types shown in the column on the right. International law,
by and large, develops as an extension of the internal constitutional order of
the hegemonic state. In the central column are the strategists who promoted
the transformations of state-form or of military tactics, together with the
thinkers who located those developments historically and justified the new
direction. I have taken the liberty of adding Bobbitt although all he says on
the matter is that the market state still awaits its theorist. I have also indi-
cated those theorists that appear to be closest to Bobbitt’s own account of
each period.
Bobbitt’s historical lesson is that ‘The State is born in violence: only
when it has achieved a legitimate monopoly on violence can it promul-
gate law: only when it is free of the coercive violence of other states can
it pursue strategy.’68 The paradox is evident. The constitutional lawyer in
fact holds out much less hope for law than for force. Thus the Cold War
is presented as a noble and generous act through which nuclear deter-
rence held the ring against communist expansion after the failure of Wil-
sonian ideas of global democracy was made evident with the Second
World War. In this sense, Bobbitt shares much with the perspective of
Carl Schmitt in which politics is the realm of the relations between friend
and enemy. More broadly, many allege that Schmitt’s views have, via his
student Leo Strauss, influenced much conservative thinking in the United
States. Indeed, Anne Norton now speaks of a Straussian moment in Amer-
ican foreign policy with academics such as Fukuyama, Kristol and Kagan,
and policy-makers such as Paul Wolfowitz (undersecretary for Defence),
Abram Shulsky (director of the Office of Special Plans, providing Wol-
fowitz with intelligence connecting Iraq to terrorism), and Leon Kass
(chair of the President’s Council on Bioethics) all involved in the Bush
administration.69
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FIGURE 3 A schematic representation of Bobbitt’s account of the evolving relations between
law, strategy and history.
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Bobbitt argues that in the new world of the market state, the US must
adjust its attitude to military strategy and to international law. The market
state has emerged because Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher per-
suaded their electorates that the state could no longer deliver welfare, only
opportunity. Thus the market state was born. In a market state, public opin-
ion is influenced by commercially owned media. Indeed, political candi-
dates are funded by special interests. Together these ensure that those who
have most at stake in society have most influence. This is a welcome depar-
ture from earlier majoritarian forms of democracy.70 Until the United States
realises the sort of society it has become, it will not evolve an appropriate
strategic posture. In the first place, the US has a practical monopoly on the
capacity to wage global conflict. Thus it cannot agree to be bound by
restrictions, such as those proposed by the International Court of Justice,
proposed by states with less capacity to act, and thus less responsibility to
act. And the US really must act for it needs to prevent Russia and China
from destroying the global environment and Germany and Japan from
acquiring nuclear weapons.71 The world will accept this American leader-
ship as long as it secures thereby environmental protection and nuclear
non-proliferation.72 From now on, the United States should act as leader of
shifting coalitions of the willing both in war-making and peace-making. By
controlling access to strategic intelligence, the United States can make it
almost impossible for any nation to prevail in defiance of US interests, even
in a regional war. The information umbrella replaces the nuclear umbrella
and the United States bears the cost of making the world an unsafe place
for terrorists, tyrants and other aggressors. Following the ideology of the
market state, the US will intervene in places where the inhabitants do not
have the market-given right to explore (commercial) opportunities. The US
will police a world in which borders are about markets and not territory.73 It
will spend money on its armed forces in order to give all peoples of the
world the opportunity to choose prosperity instead of being constrained by
the ‘civilisational apartheid’ of such as Islamic theocracies.74 In return, the
United States runs a trade deficit and those sheltering under its protection,
who save money by not having to arm themselves, finance this deficit and
thereby own a share of the American economy.75
If Bobbitt has identified a universal set of relations between law, strat-
egy and history, then his conclusions about the sort of law and strategy
appropriate for our new historical period can follow directly from his
account of the new realities. Yet Bobbitt’s normative conclusions about the
necessity for American force to prevail in the world are only loosely deter-
mined by the historical account of global conflict that he provides. In the
first place, the causal links between his three realms of law, strategy and
history are unstable. His arguments about the strategic future for the United
States are based on a ‘reality’ whereby an ideological innovation in the form
of the State (rolling back the state) produces a set of values that in turn
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inform strategy (exporting the capacity to make choices to all places) and
law (reinforcing the right of the wealthy and mighty to export opportunity).
For the earlier times his arguments were quite different. For those periods, it
was innovations in techniques of warfare that influenced the political form
of the state and thus the constitutional order of the society of states. In the
second place, it is not clear that his market state really does deliver all the
benefits he promises. It is surely too sanguine to suggest, as he does, that
private firms need limited environmental regulation because they know
only too well that consumers will reward them with customer loyalty for
having green policies. Nor is it clear that the United States really is taking
the lead in securing global environmental protection. In fact, George Bush,
according to James Connaughton, Chair of the White House Council on
Environmental Quality, ‘opposes any treaty or policy that would cause the
loss of a single American job.’76
GLOBAL STRATEGY
Mackinder saw, then, a world that was becoming unified, in which conflict
was an ever-present danger, and in which power and wealth were effec-
tively controlled by a zero-sum game. Mackinder also told his audience at
the Royal Geographical Society (RGS) where and how they should act. He
said that there was a defensible basket of resources in straddling Western
Russia and Eastern Europe that, now linked to a trans-continental railway
system, could arm and sustain either a Teutonic or a Slav race should either
establish monopoly control over it. Thus Russia and Germany should be
kept penned up behind a cluster of buffer states that could prevent either
from moving to hold sway across this resource-base. Neither could then
control the World Island. Furthermore, Russia should not be allowed access
to the eastern Mediterranean for fear it would use its industrial muscle to
intervene in European affairs.
Mackinder changed his mind over time about just how far east and
south this defensible basket of resources extended but his heartland thesis
has been a recurring theme in Anglo-American geopolitics. It has a number
of problems and these remain pertinent for those modern strategic thinkers
who have recourse to a similar form of argument. There are four central dif-
ficulties with this perspective. First, it oversimplifies geopolitical structures
by imposing the Manichean friend-enemy view upon a more complex
world. Second, it overemphasises the significance of contiguity. Third, it has
no faith in markets. Finally, it is liable to disruption both by evolving tech-
nologies and by the development of resources in new regions.
David Harvey’s account of the informal US Empire in the Middle East
shares much with Mackinder’s account. It emphasises the lure of a resource
basket but now, whereas Mackinder was mainly concerned with coal, iron
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and corn, Harvey says that now ‘it’s all about oil.’77 Robert Harvey, former MP
and former member of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Commit-
tee, notes that the West has pledged $100 billion to the development of the
Caspian oil reserves.78 He claims that Bin Laden’s ultimate aim is to deprive
the United States of any use of Saudi oil.79 Robert Harvey is certainly overstat-
ing his case here, for Bin Laden’s cultural and religious goals should be taken
seriously; he wants to re-establish the medieval Muslim Caliphate through
the extension of regimes similar to the Emirate of Afghanistan under the
Taliban.80 In turn, David Harvey suggests that the US strategic interest in the
region is to control the world’s oil spigot and thus control the pattern of glo-
bal development for the next fifty years, restricting the growth of competitors
such as China.81 Michael Klare also argues that modern conflict is essentially
about resources: ‘Whereas international conflict was until recently governed by
political and ideological considerations, the wars of the future will largely be
fought over the possession and control of vital economic goods – especially
resources needed for the functioning of modern industrial societies.’82
Robert Harvey sees something unique in the current unchallengeable
power of the United States as the world’s lone hegemon. At present, the
US spends half the world’s defence budget on its own armed forces as
well as selling to its allies a good share of the other arms adrift in the
world. The United States, and many commentators, want to believe that
there is essentially only one struggle going on in world geopolitics, only
one real game in town. This Manichean vision insists that there are no
neutrals in the great struggle to come, called, for now, the War on Terror.
But the world will not come as clean as strategists think it. The Russians
and the Chinese will not allow the United States a monopoly on Gulf or
Caspian oil and yet neither shares significant interests with Bin Laden. US
interests in the Middle East are shaped by its support for Israel, even
where that threatens its access to oil. A nation’s geopolitical interests are
frequently contradictory and the search for resources is never alone
among them. The Bush administration is pro-Israel because of the close
ties between many of the neo-conservatives and the Likud Party in Israel
and it is pro-Saudi Arabia because of the Bush family’s close links with the
royal Saud family forged through their joint financial ventures. In August
2001 Prince Bandar went so far as to tell Bush that the alliance between
the United States and Saudi Arabia would be aborted since ‘there has been
a strategic decision by the United States that its national interest in the
Middle East is 100 percent based on Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.’83
Bush immediately moved to embrace the opposite pole affirming in a pri-
vate letter his support for the creation of a Palestinian state. The contradic-
tions are both ideological and material. It does not seem plausible to
suggest that religious mobilisation is only ever a cover for resource wars.
Nor is it persuasive to argue that resources have only achieved salience as
a strategic priority in recent years.
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When Mackinder led the British expeditionary force into South Russia
in 1919, ideology and not only resources were at stake. Furthermore, these
ideological issues resonated at home as much as abroad. When Beatrice
Webb noted that while Mackinder spoke in terms of physical geography
and geostrategy he was being made painfully aware of ‘another type of
momentum – the uprising of the manual workers within each modern state …
it is an uncomfortable shadow falling across his admirable maps of the rise
and fall of empires.’84 While Bobbitt may be exaggerating the clarity of Ger-
man intentions in the First World War, he is no doubt right that among them
was the idea that war would avert the threat of socialist revolution heralded
by the Social Democratic electoral victory in 1912.85 There is a spatial fetish-
ism in investing spaces with political significance and in exteriorising the
sources of threats to the social order: only patriots or traitors (not oppo-
nents) within, only friends or enemies (no non-aligned) without.
A second difficulty with this spatial vision is that it over-emphasises the
significance of contiguity. In part, and certainly for military strategy, the sig-
nificance of proximity is a function both of transport costs and of transport
technologies. This was what Leo Amery raised when Mackinder read his
paper to that evening meeting of the Royal Geographical Society in 1904.
Amery, less than six months after the Wright brothers’ first successful flight in
their ‘Kitty Hawk,’ asked what significance the airplane might have for mili-
tary strategy and would it not change the whole concept of a military front
as currently understood. This was prescient although there were nowhere
near enough airplanes in use in the First World War to unearth the soldiers
from their trenches. Similar things are being urged now about the conse-
quences of so-called networked warfare. Bruce Berkowitz argues that infor-
mation technology, satellite communications and tracking, and guided
missiles have rendered the concept of ‘the front’ obsolete and ‘everyone
and everything is part of the battlefield today and a potential target.’86 Prox-
imity is further reduced in significance if, as Berkowitz and Barnett believe,
smaller units of embedded soldiers will be used for many of the conflicts to
come.87 Only if the technology of war remains the use of massed armies to
defeat opponents arranged on the battlefield will staging posts near battle-
fields be needed for the congregation of the massed ranks of enormous
armies.
Proximity of course matters. Networked soldiers and long range bomb-
ing may conquer space in the taking of a country but, as experience in Iraq
underlines, in the establishment of a stable regime after the conquest, space
and contiguity reassert themselves. Furthermore, pipelines have to pass
from oil fields to ports and Klare notes how many relatively small units of
US troops are currently posted around the world guarding pipelines. The
United States has also taken an interest in restricting pipelines to routes
through friendly countries. The boycott on doing business with Iran has
meant that ‘none of the major Caspian oil consortia will be able to construct
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pipelines through Iran.’88 In this respect, US policy is guided by something
like Mackinder’s territorial concerns but the United States is much less
dependent upon oil from the Middle East than are other world regions. In
1995 only a little over 10% of the oil exports from the Middle East were for
North America even though many of the other oil exports are handled by
US companies.89 However, the accumulation of wealth in these resource-
exporting countries is cause for concern. In the early 1990s, for example,
Saudi Arabia received three-quarters of all arms exports from the United
Kingdom; and several countries in the Persian Gulf, again most notably
Saudi Arabia, have purchased truly awesome amounts of sophisticated
weaponry from the United States.90 These were sold with a view to helping
these countries resist the threat from their neighbours, namely Iraq and Iran.
Here, the focus on proximity is the occasion for the proliferation of weap-
onry to an incredible degree. A related policy was followed when helping
the Afghans resist the Soviets, with the result that several hundred surface-
to-air missiles are now unaccounted for, and presumed to be in terrorist
hands. If deterrence need not involve extensive ground warfare why, apart
from profit, arm so powerfully all these somewhat unstable countries? If
anything, the lure of contiguity is justifying policies that will make the
region less and not more stable. All too often arms sales protect regimes
against internal opposition and further militarise those regimes rendering
them resistant to popular democracy. Visions of countries as prone to fall
domino-like in sequence, direct attention to threats from neighbours and
downplay internal sources of change. Yet this Manichean geography, in
which friends are recruited to stand staunch against enemies, has shored up
regimes that promise friendship in foreign policy but whose treatment of
their own people has been allowed to fall below the radar of the arms-sales
calculus.
Finally, the strategic emphasis in these Mackinder-like world-views
reinforces the zero-sum logic of closed-space thinking. There is only so
much territory in the world and the more of it under our control, the better
for us. During the Cold War, this logic justified aiding and abetting regimes
of torture and violence in poor countries wherever there was a risk that
popular opinion was not going to produce a friendly, that is pro-capitalist,
government. A good deal of suffering was visited upon the people of poor
countries as a result of a suite of policies that saw communist insurgency
where often there was only populist (anti-colonial) nationalism.91 In the
War on Terror we already see several such unsavoury allies being courted
as we countenance and draw intelligence from regimes that now torture
Muslims not Communists, as witnessed by the recently replaced British
ambassador to Uzbekistan.92 Not everybody who is not with us is against
us. Furthermore, if we act as if they are, then we may end up producing the
behaviour to justify our initial assumption. At present the United States has
troops stationed in 120 of the 189 member states of the United Nations.93
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With characteristic candour, Cheney has suggested that there are sixty states
against which the United States would be justified in launching pre-emptive
strikes.94 These are indeed the actions and attitudes of imperialists. Imperial-
ists believe in protecting cheap energy supplies through military effort. The
alternatives are to adjust to more expensive energy through energy saving,
import substitution and buying supplies from new places. All these will hap-
pen as new transportation technologies, perhaps based on hydrogen, are
developed, or as more expensive local hydrocarbon sources in shales are
exploited, or as new regions, such as West Africa, become major oil export-
ers. All would reduce the significance of the particular heartland that cur-
rently attracts attention.
CONCLUSION
I have suggested that there are three ways that the current ideologists of the
American Empire echo some of the basic features of Mackinder’s
geopolitical vision. These similarities cannot be put down to the continued
interest in Mackinder’s writings. Instead, I think that these similarities can be
explained by the way they can serve to naturalise empire. The emphasis on
a recent historical rupture gives urgency to the proposed geopolitical strat-
egy. Rather than challenge previous ways of seeing the world, this discur-
sive strategy discounts them as no longer relevant. The world, it is
suggested, has changed dramatically. Of course, this strategy is always open
to the challenge that it exaggerates how new things now are and that it fails
to learn the lessons of the recent past. Thus Mackinder exaggerated the
extent to which extensive production in the colonies had reached any sort
of limit and he exaggerated the extent of Britain’s absolute although not rel-
ative industrial decline. Yet he needed to argue these things in order to
present as essential his proposed transfer of British commercial policy from
one of free trade to one of imperial protection. Likewise, the neo-conserva-
tives in the main exaggerate the rupture with the period of the Cold War.
There are significant continuities, particularly in the relationship between
US foreign policy and US trade policy. However, by arguing that the world
has changed in ways that they understand best, they can promote a radical
rejection of the multilateralism that they see as an unwelcome constraint
upon the actions of the world’s remaining hegemon. Furthermore, by pre-
senting the new era as one of closed-space, or globalisation, Mackinder,
and his ironic echoes among the neo-conservatives, is able to urge upon
audience the need to adopt a global, imperial vision of relentless attention
to the internal affairs of every place upon the Earth. Globalisation appears
to justify intervention everywhere since everywhere affects everywhere else.
In the second place, Mackinder saw geopolitics as essentially about
conflict. These conflicts were rooted in the struggle for survival between
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biologically distinct subsets of the human species. By presenting the struggle
as being both inevitable and essential to survival, military strength appears as
the only option. What this excludes, of course, is the relationship between
external conflict and struggles within society. The external conflict must
take precedence over any domestic social or economic issues. In fact, Mac-
kinder urged that domestic issues be addressed in the name of national effi-
ciency in order that in the international struggles to come the British soldier
might not be found wanting. There were other contemporary views of Brit-
ain’s geopolitical circumstances that served different, and more liberal
visions of its possible role in the world.95 The role of social reform in pro-
ducing a more effective American population does not appear to be on the
political agenda in the United States just now but in most other ways much
current geopolitical thinking echoes Mackinder’s ideas. The world is seen as
a dangerous place. The survival of the United States is seen as in question.
Richard Clarke, who was at the time in charge of counter-terrorism strategy
for the White House, quotes George Bush as remarking in the aftermath of
the attacks of September 11, 2001: ‘I don’t care what the international lawyers
say, we are going to kick some ass.’96 The country must be put on a war
footing so that it can fight the large section of humanity holding a different
value system. And again, by putting things in terms of national survival,
alternatives can be painted as perhaps unpatriotic. Conflicts within society
are almost treason when it is faced with bare survival. Yet these internal
divisions will not disappear. Class struggles in the United States continue.
Divisions within and between the countries with large Muslim populations
do not really register in the clash of civilisations thesis but they are signifi-
cant nonetheless.
Finally, the echoes of Mackinder are found in the characterisation of
military strategies for controlling a resource-defined heartland of the global
economy. To some extent it is in part the same region that is currently
receiving most attention.97 Access to resources is clearly a commercial boon
for the companies in the extractive industries and governments have always
tried to promote abroad the interests of national companies, but with oil in
particular, we are told that securing a supply for Western countries is a mat-
ter of national survival. The US memory of the OPEC crisis of 1973 is that
the country was held hostage to its need for oil. The military effort to keep
cheap supplies flowing is very expensive and it may even save money to
reduce dependence on foreign supplies.98 Mackinder drew certain conclu-
sions from his study of the geography of natural resources, particularly
about the need to deny Russia a warm-water port. He also thought it quite
acceptable for the British to assign territories and constitutions to places so
that they might serve the higher goal of preserving Anglo-Saxon global
hegemony. In other words, local self-determination mattered only where it
would serve this goal. Much the same is true now with countries being
divided up or kept unwillingly together simply to serve American strategic
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purposes. The division of Iraq into three independent or strongly federal
states will be accepted by the United States only as a last resort, regardless
of local views.
There are alternatives to the Hobbesian geopolitics of Mackinder and
the geostrategists of the War on Terror. We can buy the resources we
need without hemming the source regions with military bases and fiercely
armed friendly states. We could develop international institutions to arbi-
trate resource conflicts. In many cases, this would be cheaper for both
sides than war or an arms race. We could promote further the work of the
International Energy Agency, formed after the 1974 Arab oil boycott to
explore alternative ways of sharing oil among Western countries in the
event of a similar emergency.99 The European Union shows that sover-
eignty can be shared between states and such pooling arrangements can
build trust, and might be tried elsewhere.100 The territorial assumption that
delimited spaces on the Earth’s surface stand for distinct interests has
always threatened minorities with majoritarian tyranny and Northern
Ireland is not the only place where alternatives need to be found.101 Fed-
eral solutions help where groups are spatially concentrated but in more
integrated societies parity of esteem and protections for minority rights are
needed. Before we accept too readily that we face unique ‘present dan-
gers’102 that call for the abridgement of civil liberties at home and the pro-
motion of exemplary wars abroad, we should pause. Also giving papers at
the Royal Geographical Society in 1904 was Peter Kropotkin and he pre-
sented a very different vision of the potential shape of international rela-
tions.103 Might not the break in geopolitical history that we can achieve
be a step into a world of stronger international institutions, not weaker
ones?104 Of course, this would mean the most powerful states abridging
their room for independent manoeuvre. Yet, they might gain a security
and peace dividend thereby. Instead of viewing the world as a zero-sum
game of interminable conflict, might we not recognise that co-operation
and mutual assistance have played, and continue to play, a significant role
in economic development. Nations, regions, religions, and ethnicities are
not always and everywhere at each other’s throats. Finally, instead of mili-
tarising our world still further in the face of geostrategic anxieties, might
we not seek to demilitarise our fragile planet. The rich countries could
start by buying back the weapons they have sold to the juntas that
oppress the poor, and the triumphant West could buy up all the Soviet
materiel it can find as part of a new version of Marshall aid and in our col-
lective interest to prevent proliferation. In the United States, Senators Sam
Nunn and Dick Lugar have been working to promote a Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program for this purpose, and while its efforts in Russia
are currently mired in financial scandal, in some Post-Soviet states, such as
Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, much has been done to re-employ
atomic scientists in making safe atomic and chemical stockpiles.105 The
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defence spending of the United States in 2003 was about $400 billion and
$1 billion went to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Defence
spending in the United States in 2003 was some 15% above the levels that
prevailed during the Cold War.106 Mackinder would feel all too at home in
the world of the War on Terror, and after a century of world wars and
genocide that is really a very depressing reflection.
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